

German security agencies cracked down on one militia, another was prone to spring up, extending armed operations against Serbian and Kosovar Albanian émigrés as well as symbols of the Tito state. For these reasons, both main political parties in Germany distanced themselves from the Croats, treating them as a law-enforcement problem.

Though the Social Democratic Party initially tended to fight shy of potentially embarrassing entanglements of this kind, both the party leadership and elements of the New Left in Germany did reach out to some immigrant groups from the early 1960s onward. Algerian nationalists, Greek campaigners against the colonels' dictatorship, and Spanish anti-Franco activists obtained advice, support, and occasionally quite substantial financial subsidies from their left-wing German patrons. Still more exotic elements, like the small Iranian community, also found German champions: the student activist Rudi Dutschke cut his teeth as a campaigner when he helped to orchestrate a protest against a visit to Berlin by the Shah of Iran in June 1967.

Indigenous sympathies for immigrant communities, though, tended to be shallow, instrumental, and evanescent. The Poles were largely ignored, being too anti-socialist for the Left and too committed to the *Oder-Neisse* frontier for the Right. Even more ideologically congenial minorities could find themselves abruptly discarded when a more attractive outlet for protest activities materialized, as the Iranians discovered when the Vietnam War began to dominate the headlines.

Alexander Clarkson's treatment of the relationship between the German state and the émigré groups in the Federal Republic is soundly researched and clearly argued. But it is also rather narrow in focus. Relying as he does mainly on state archives and newspaper accounts, the security problems raised by the presence of these communities on German soil in the context of broader Cold War antagonisms is heavily emphasized. By contrast, the question of "the integration of ethnic minorities into the cultural and political institutions of [the] host society" (p. 186), which the author rightly recognizes as an important part of the story, receives much less attention. Nor is there much in the way of a comparative context here, a curious omission in light of the fact that neighboring countries at precisely the same time were facing similar challenges, but responding to them in very different ways. Many of the problems Clarkson describes have escalated and metastasized in more recent years (as, for example, shown by the Hamburg affiliation of some of the 9/11 hijackers). Still, within its self-imposed limits, this is a useful contribution to the study of a difficulty with which most countries in an increasingly globalized world are either currently grappling or will find themselves compelled to address in the near future.

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EDITH SHEFFER. *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain*. Foreword by PETER

SCHNEIDER. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xvii, 357. \$29.95.

The Berlin Wall still grips public attention as the iconic Cold War border. By shifting our focus to a less sensational border in a rural region dividing East and West Germany, Edith Sheffer's brilliant book reveals how geopolitical conflicts and state-imposed policing may have redrawn the map, but that "local actions actually constituted the border" (p. 37) and the Iron Curtain was actually an improvised "living system" (p. 167). The "Burned Bridge" was a medieval road, made of logs burned to prevent rot, connecting the toy manufacturing towns of Sonneberg and Neustadt bei Coburg. For Sheffer it becomes the perfect metaphor for the Iron Curtain, as the new Cold War physical and mental border severed these towns' interconnection, fatefully putting Sonneberg into the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Neustadt into the Federal Republic (FRG). Starting in the 1940s and ending just after 1989, Sheffer's narrative demonstrates how average citizens' local responses normalized these new political fissures to make possible the Berlin Wall's erection and the inter-German border's closure in 1961.

Sheffer uncovers moments of cross-border interaction, previously forgotten because they fit less neatly into Iron Curtain narratives of rigid separation. Thus, she builds on recent historiography depicting the entangled everyday development of East and West Germany, and she helps explain both the border's fluidity and its encroaching strictness. Her examples are striking. From 1949 to 1951 the GDR organized public relations events, including soccer matches between the two towns, mass shopping trips to Neustadt, and invitations to Western Leftists to participate in propaganda events. The regime soon realized it could not control these crossings as planned, just as it could not stem smuggler traffic or refugees to the West. In a chicken-and-egg quandary, the border created troubles of smuggling and migration, which in turn legitimized the creeping disciplining of the frontier as an entity.

Sheffer revises views of the border as a solely Eastern bloc imposition by showing how various types of actors constituted the border. Frontier residents on both sides neglected to question openly the border's legitimacy. In the early years of the still porous border, Neustadt citizens found their situation on the Western frontier economically advantageous and demanded border regulations to stop the flow of Eastern refugees, the threat of Soviet military violence, and smugglers. Ultimately, the West used the border as a self-legitimizing bulwark against totalitarianism. In the East, civilian participation in the border regime was even more notable. For Sonneberg, Sheffer describes a dynamic relationship between the GDR police apparatus and the population that, like the border itself, involved both repression and popular participation. The notorious Stasi—the GDR secret police—exerted power through individualized controls, manipulating lives in what she calls "the primacy of population politics" (p. 143). But locals also

participated in various forms of self-surveillance. Nonetheless, continued flight across the border exposed the weakness and failure of these controls.

The strict enforcement of this border reached a shocking watershed, not with the Berlin Wall's erection in 1961, but in 1952 with a campaign the GDR called "Action Vermin" to militarily fortify the border and cleanse the frontier of politically unreliable residents. In one of the book's most dramatic and important chapters, Sheffer suggests that the 1952 militarization of the Prohibited Zone may have been the "critical turning point in German division" (p. 97). Eschewing familiar tropes of totalitarian repression, Sheffer's nuanced account reveals how the East German regime's own weakness necessitated state reliance on local participation, such that border residents contributed to their own captivity. Amid general confusion and bungled execution, community non-compliance and limited upheaval prevented deportation of around 60 percent of Sonneberg County's listed targets, many of whom immediately fled westward. Nevertheless, local administrators and "helpers" drew up deportation lists and supervised transports. Generally, "social discipline prevailed" (p. 109) to enable the state to transplant 8,369 residents overall, 375 from Sonneberg, further inland. No doubt the deportations were coercive, and Sheffer compares categorization of deportees, including the "work-shy," "black-marketeers," "captialist," and "asocial," to those used by the Nazis. But in practice, the population often viewed the targeting of particular individuals as arbitrary. Though ultimately a sign of regime weakness, this randomness bred greater fear among civilians whose paranoid inaction, "cynical conformity" (p. 188), or indeed collaboration then lent the state its power. Successes and gaffes from this effort became lessons for further deportations and division in 1961.

Sheffer further describes how, even after fortification in 1961, crossings abated, but did not cease. Ongoing engagement with the border and adaptation to separate political economies over decades contributed to a mentality of differences that continued after reunification. For example, Neustadters exploited the border for economic profit at home or crossed to Sonneberg for cheap goods and services. The frontier population adopted a new "vocabulary of difference" (p. 49) demarcating the "poor East" and the "golden West," concepts promoted in media and for the cause of Western border tourism into the 1980s. Sheffer's meticulous research into local and federal German archives, interviews, the press, and questionnaires exposes at a micro-level how power was exerted diffusely in Germany's Cold War regimes. The book suggests that through daily actions borders can become instruments of demographic control, both violently coercive and encouraging complicity from average citizens.

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LAURA HEINS. *Nazi Film Melodrama*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013. Pp. viii, 240. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$30.00.

Through substantial chapters on romance, domestic, and home-front melodrama, Laura Heins explores a universal genre in a very particular time and place. Triangulated with Nazi film and melodrama are gender politics. Drawing out convincing contradictions between theory and practice in Nazi cultural politics, the author catalogues sometimes surprising themes in these films: an absence of weddings; "marriage as a potentially dissolvable, economically defined institution" (p. 107); love triangles "narrated from the position of the rival" (p. 113); the abandonment of family as microcosm of a larger social order; or—the objection of a male critic in 1941—"the eroticization of non-'Aryan' women on Third Reich screens" (p. 172).

As a genre term, "melodrama" runs the inherent risk of being ahistorical. The 12 years of the "Nazi millennium" (with due linkages to Weimar cinema as precursor, and far fewer to any post-World War II continuities) meaningfully stake out the territory covered here. However the comparator throughout, contemporaneous Hollywood melodrama, largely remains in parallel to Nazi melodrama, which blurs a more complex interplay. The book's subject is a focused instance (Nazi cinema within German cinema) of the long-standing interrelationship between Hollywood and European cinemas more broadly. The opening sentence states: "The Nazi film industry, although the weapon of a regime founded on brutal militarism, produced at least ten times more domestic and romance melodramas than war films" (p. 1). But not all the Nazi years were war years, however much the writing was on the wall. Veit Harlan's *The Great King* (1942), ostensibly about Frederick the Great and transparently "about" Hitler's Germany, was both domestic melodrama and war film; indeed "melodrama" is endlessly capable of cross-genre fusion. Mention of Harlan's film also immediately problematizes the book's attention to "the systematic intentions built into the Nazi melodrama" (p. 2). For the system-driven reediting of *The Great King* nonetheless retained a strong sense of the suffering of the "Volk," before that became the norm in historical reality. Throughout the book Hollywood provides a comparator in matters of aesthetics, genre, and style (and film sequences receive some excellent close analysis, secondary literature some lively discussion). But Hollywood is not Washington, and of course up until its entry into World War II, America's own political equation was markedly different. Here "Nazi," however, embraces expansionist nation and national cultural politics as they filtered down to film studios.

High quality film stills and posters support the text, but inconsistencies in naming directors means a filmography was needed. More on the *melos* of melodrama, the effect of soundtrack music (not least in Douglas Sirk's *Final Accord* [1936]), would have been welcome: Wim Wenders attributed his embrace of American pop